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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to analyze the international laws governing the use of children in armed
conflict.  Despite the prohibition of the use of child soldiers in armed conflict in international
law, States and non-State actors continue to actively recruit, abduct, and directly use children,
some as young as eight, in hostilities.  International humanitarian law’s limited scope  prevents it
from protecting the world’s most vulnerable children, child soldiers, while human rights
instruments adopted to make up for these limitations lack enforcement mechanisms, therefore
rendering the much-needed protection for child soldiers inadequate. As development of
international law concerning child soldiers progresses on paper, progress on the ground lags
behind, thus creating a gap between progress in the law and the enforcement of this law on the
ground.  The international community needs to take steps to bridge this gap so that the practice
on the ground is at par with the law.  The term “use of child soldiers” means recruitment,
utilization, and participation of children in armed conflict.
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1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
“I think with sorrow of those living and growing up against a background of war, of those who have
known nothing but conflict and violence. . . . What a terrible legacy for their future! Children need peace;
they have a right to it.” 1
Approximately 300,000 children below the age of eighteen are used in both international
and national conflicts around the world.2  Twenty million children have died as a result of
participation in armed conflict.3 Over the past two decades, the international child rights
movement has prompted the development of international law, policies, and programs
concerning the use of child soldiers.4  Yet in spite of the stronger laws and advocacy that have
resulted in United Nation’s Security Council resolutions, international agreements, domestic
legislation, and establishment of country-specific ad hoc tribunals, both national armies and rebel
groups continue to recruit and use children in armed conflict.5 This blatant disregard of
international law is proof that the practice on the ground has not caught up with the written law.
Focus needs to shift from developing international legal standards protecting children in armed
conflict to ensuring that these standards are enforced on the ground.6  Those using child soldiers
are willing to ignore the longstanding ethical norms and will likely be un-deterred by new ones
                                                 
1 His Holiness Pope John Paul II, Address at the celebration of the World Day of Peace (Jan 1, 1999).
2 Marsha L. Hackenberg, Can the Optional Protocol For the Convention on the Rights of the Child Protect the
Ugandan Child Soldier? 10 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 417, 418 (2000).
3 Id.
4 Symposium, International Law Barring Child Soldiers in Combat: Problems in Enforcement and Accountability,
37 Cornell Int’l L.J. 531 (2004).
5 Id. at 534; Mike Crawley, Everyone’s Outraged, but Children Still Fight Wars: Promises by Militias, Government
Not to Use them Often Broken, Chicago Sun-Times, November 21, 2004, at 45.
6 Leyla Linton, U.N. Report Urges Sanctions on Users of Child Soldiers, Contra Costa Times (Walnut Creek, CA),
February 10, 2005.
2or persuaded by moral appeal.7 The international community needs to realize that the practice of
using children as soldiers is not accidental.8  This practice reflects the use of a well-planned
doctrine, resulting from conscious and deliberate decisions.9  Unless and until the international
community understands the doctrine that drives the use of child soldiers, the prohibitions against
child soldiering will be empty and will continue to be violated.10  Making laws is not the same as
finding ways to enforce them.11  Stronger legal standards are essential but they, by themselves,
are not enough to stop the practice of child soldiering.12  Passing resolutions in the United
Nations Security Council one after another and adopting treaty after treaty in the international
community is not enough without ensuring that they are followed with specific action.13 In order
to be effective at preventing the practice of child soldiering, the root causes of child soldiering
need to be analyzed.14 In short, knowledge is needed about why adults find the recruitment of
children desirable and, similarly, why children volunteer for armed conflict.  In understanding
the causes, as well as the resulting dynamics, guided strategies that attack the very heart of the
practice can be developed.15
This thesis examines the use of children as soldiers in armed conflict and the various
international legal standards governing their use.  In so doing, it examines the applicability and
                                                 
7 P.W. Singer, Talk is Cheap: Getting Serious about Preventing Child Soldiers, 37 Cornell Int’l L.J. 561, 573
(2004).
8 Id. at 574.
9 Id. at 573. “Groups deciding to adopt the child soldier doctrine have never been ignorant about whether it was the
ethical thing to do or confused as to what exactly was allowed under international law or norms of proper behavior.
The codes against using children as soldiers have existed for thousands of years. . . .  [For example], the LTTE
(Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam) in Sri Lanka has one of the most systemized approaches in its execution of the
child soldier doctrine—ranging from sophisticated recruiting strategies using computer databases to a complicated
structure of training camps and deployment strategies. . . .  This group pointedly omits the dates of birth on the
headstones of its child soldiers, knowing that history will harshly judge their exploitation of these children.”
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Jo Becker, Child Soldiers: Changing a Culture of Violence, 32 WTR Hum. Rts. 16, 17 (2005).
13 Crawley, supra note 5.
14 Singer, supra note 7, at 562.
15 Id.
3enforcements of these legal standards in theory and on the ground. Chapter two discusses the
causes and methods of child recruitment in armed conflict as well as the consequences of child
recruitment and participation.  The chapter suggests ways of eliminating and preventing child
recruitment and also suggests ways of addressing the consequences of child participation in
armed conflict.  Chapter three examines current legal standards governing the use of child
soldiers.  The first part of chapter three, part A, examines the scope of international humanitarian
law relative to the use of child soldiers and discusses the inapplicability of current international
humanitarian law in armed conflicts, especially in internal armed conflicts where most child
soldiers are found; therefore, showing the limited protection international humanitarian law
affords child soldiers.  The second part chapter three, part B, examines efforts that have been
made by the international community to improve the protection afforded child soldiers by
developing international law relative to child soldiers through the adoption of both international
and regional human rights instruments and declarations.  This part analyzes the human rights
instruments relative to child soldiers at length by looking at their strengths and weaknesses in
relation to the protection they afford child soldiers. The third and last part of chapter three, part
C, discusses the growing gap between this developing law concerning child soldiers and practice
on the ground. That is to say, while there has been progress in developing and adopting laws
protecting child soldiers, the practice of child soldiering has continued to thrive on the ground.
Part C of chapter three discusses and suggests different ways to narrow this gap.  Chapter four
concludes that until the root causes of child recruitment and participation are dealt with, children
will continue to volunteer in armed conflicts and government and non-government armed forces
will continue to recruit them.  Chapter five concludes that focus needs to shift from developing
the law relative to child soldiers to actually enforcing it.
4CHAPTER TWO
RECRUITMENT AND PARTICIPATION OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT.
Traditionally, children were protected by cultural presumptions that they were
noncombatants.16  The first widespread use of child soldiers was in the Second World War. 17
Since then, the lack of child involvement in combat has disappeared.18   In recent years, the use
of child soldiers in armed conflict has significantly increased.19 The underlying causes for the
increased use of child soldiers is poverty, lack of economic and educational opportunity for
many youths, and the spread of war and disease.20  Increase in the use of children as soldiers is
also attributed to a number of other factors.  Since the end of the Cold War, protecting children
from human rights abuses has become difficult because of the nature of conflicts today, which
are more internalized, localized, and grounded in nationalistic, ethnic, and religious conflict.21
Also, wars today do not occur on well-defined battlefields but in cities and towns, making the
abduction of children from schools, buses, churches, and villages easier for recruiters.22
Moreover, because of the post-Cold War surplus, there are as many as 500 million small arms
around the globe.23  Consequently, the increased reliance on small arms and light weapons has
made using children as soldiers practical since these weapons are easily obtainable, relatively
                                                 
16 Colleen C. Maher, The Protection of Children in Armed Conflict:  A Human Rights Analysis of the Protection
Afforded to Children in Warfare, B.C. Third World L.J. 297, 301 (1989).
17 Id.  (discussing the use of children as spies and porters by the Nazis during the Second World War).
18 Id.
19 Amy Beth Abbott, Child soldiers-The use of Children as Instruments of War, 23 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev 499,
508 (2000).
20 Singer, supra note 7, at 563.
21 Abott, supra note 19, at 508.
22 Id; Jimmy Carter, Kid Soldiers a War’s Most Tragic Victim, USA Today, June 30, 1998, at 11A (discussing
factors leading to increase in child soldiers).
23 Singer, supra note 7, at 565.
5cheap, and easy to use and transport.24 Unlike earlier weapons, which required precision aiming
and physical strength, these weapons are ultra-light automatic weapons that can be carried and
fired by children as young as ten.25  With the firepower of such weapons, children can become
deadly combatants.26  Unfortunately, trade in these arms is largely unregulated and embargoes
are rarely respected.27 To make matters worse, government control over the trade in small arms
and light weapons has decreased because private companies produce most of the small arms and
light weapons.28 A recent survey showed that 600 manufacturing firms in approximately ninety-
five countries produce small arms, light weapons, or other types of ammunition and parts.29
The protracted length of conflicts combined with the proliferation of small arms and light
weapons has made the use of children as child soldiers pragmatic.30  The longer the conflict is,
the more likely that children will be recruited.31  For example, at the end of 1995, civil wars had
been running in Angola for thirty years, in Afghanistan for seventeen years, and in Sudan for
twevle years.32 The persistence of protracted conflicts makes finding volunteers difficult;
therefore, prompting rebels and government forces to recruit the nation’s youth to alleviate the
shortage of manpower.33  Moreover, when conflicts are protracted, the root causes of the conflict
such as poverty or repression are exacerbated, thus motivating the civilian population to join
armed groups.34
                                                 
24 Nancy Morisseau, Seen but not Heard: Child Soldiers Suing Gun Manufacturers Under Alien Tort Claims Act, 89
Cornell L.Rev. 1263, 1285 (2004).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1267.
29 Id.
30 Id at 1284.
31 Abbott, supra note 19, at 511.
32 Radda Bamen, Stop Using Child Soldiers!, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, International Save the
Children Alliance, London, U.K., 1985, at 5 (pointing out that shortages of manpower will increase recruitment of
child soldiers).
33 Id.
34 Ilene Cohn & Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, 23 (1993).
6A. Forced Recruitment
Both armed opposition groups and national armed forces use actual physical force and
threats to recruit under-age children.35  Several rebel groups and national armed forces around
the world practice forced recruitment of under-age children by abducting children from
schoolyards, buses, market places, streets, churches, or refugee camps.36  The Lord’s Resistance
Army, a rebel group in northern Uganda, has abducted more than 20,000 children as fighters,
porters, and sex slaves during the eighteen-year-old civil war against the government of
President Yoweri Museveni.37  Many of the children abducted are between fourteen and sixteen
years old; however, some are as young as eight and nine.38  Burma, the largest user of child
soldiers in the world, forces children as young as eleven-years-old into their national armed
forces.39  As many as 70,000 children under the age of eighteen serve in Burma’s national armed
forces while another 6,000 to 7,000 serve in Burma’s ethnic opposition groups.40  The state has
forcibly abducted boys and girls at train and bus stations, threatening to jail them if they refuse to
comply.41  The young recruits are taken to camps for weapons training where they usually
receive regular beatings and are not given a chance to contact their families.42 Unlike other
countries that recruit child soldiers, Burma does not have reintegration and demobilization
                                                 
35 Id at 514.
36 Hackenberg, supra note 2, at 42; Burundi: Children Abducted for Military, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/11/14/burund3355.htm “All parties-whether rebel or government- have used
children to fight this horrible war.  But dragging large numbers of students from school to make them soldiers
represents a new and alarming practice.”  Alison Des Forges, Senior Adviser to the African Division of Human
Rights Watch.
37 Ann Davison, Child Soldiers: No Longer a Minor Issue, 12 Willamette J. Int’l L. Disp. Resol. 124, 141 (2004).
38 Hackenberg, supra note 2, at 424.
39 Davison, supra note 37, at 141.
40 Jo Becker, ‘A Gun as Tall as me’, Asian Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2004, at A11.
41 Davison, supra note 37, at 141.
42 Id.
7programs.43  The Burmese government continues to deny the recruitment of children into their
armed forces.44
Many of the under-age peasants recruited lack identity records documenting their date of
birth because their birth was not formally registered or because the registry was destroyed in
fighting.45  Those swept up in recruitment drives often have difficulty proving that they are
under-age or that they fall under exempted categories like students or an only son.46
Once recruited, children are used as spies, porters, and cooks.47 Although boys are more
likely to be recruited than girls, opposition forces recruit girls, whom they often rape and force to
become wives of combatants.48  The children are used as human mine detectors and frontline
troops by opposition forces because they are easy to manipulate and are considered expendable.49
These children are turned into fierce fighters through brutal indoctrination and inducement
through the use of hard drugs and alcohol.  The children are sent out to commit atrocities against
civilians, including their own families.50 Children like this end up depending on their captors and
even identifying with their cause, since they have no where else to go.
                                                 
43 Becker, supra note 40.
44 Id.
45 Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, supra note 34, at 24.
46 Id.
47 Grac’a Machel, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, at
para 27, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 108, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (1996) [hereinafter Machel study].
48Id. at para 35 ; More than 120,000 Child Soldiers Fighting in Afri ca, at
http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/apr/cs0419.htm  Concy, a fourteen-year-old girl, abducted from Uganda and taken to
Sudan by the opposition group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), recounted to one interviewer.  “In Sudan we
were distributed to men and I was given a man who had just killed his woman….  Girls who refused to become LRA
wives were killed in front of us to serve as a warning to the rest of us.”
49 Davison, supra note 37, at 138.
50 Machel Study, supra note 47, at para. 47; Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, supra note 34, at 27. In the 1980’s, RENAMO,
the Mozambican resistance group, had a recruitment practice that involved taking a boy soldier back to the village
and having him kill someone known to him.  “The killing took place in such a way that the community knew that he
had killed, thus effectively closing the door to the child ever returning to his village.”
8After killing civilians and fighting alongside the rebels, human rights workers have a
difficult time trying to reunify and reintegrate these children into their community.51
Reunification for girl soldiers that have been raped or sexually abused is particularly difficult
because cultural beliefs make staying with their families hard and any prospects of marriage are
lost.52 The girls are left with few or no alternatives and eventually end up as prostitutes. 53 Even
when the children are rescued by peacekeepers, they are often considered deserters and are
subject to on-the-spot execution if found.54 Successful reintegration of child soldiers depends
upon education, vocational opportunity, economic security, and support from family and the
community.55
Eliminating Forced Recruitment by Government Armed Forces and Armed Groups
Eliminating forced recruitment is an endeavor that needs tenacity.  A number of
approaches have been taken to stem the recruitment of child soldiers.  The United Nations
Security Council has shown promising initiative by passing resolutions that demand concrete
action plans to end child soldiering by parties in violation of international law and has threatened
measures that include travel bans on leaders, arm embargoes, and the restriction of the flow of
financial resources to parties that refuse to comply.56 Negative public media, especially directed
toward unrecognized opposition groups, could serve as an effective solution for eliminating
forced recruitment of under-age children by pressuring opposition groups to adhere to
                                                 
51 Abbott, supra note 19, at 515; Machel Study, supra note 47, at para. 55.  In some African cultures, it is spiritually
believed that the evil spirits of the victims haunt anyone who has killed; to accept a former child soldier is to accept
evil spirits.
52 See Machel Study at para. 51.
53 Id.
54 Abbott, supra note 19, at 515.
55 Id. at 516.
56 Becker, supra note 12, at 17.
9international norms.57  In some cases, for example, armed groups adhered to even greater
standards in the hope of gaining positive publicity and legitimacy.58  Foreign aid donors
supporting armed groups could be influential in pressuring their clients not to recruit under-age
children.59
Without a doubt, however, stronger efforts are needed to end impunity.  Recruiters are
rarely held accountable for recruiting children under the age prescribed by law or policy.60  They
know recruiting under-age children is a war crime but seem to believe that they will never be
brought to justice.61 There is no need for additional law in this area, given the number of treaties,
declarations, and resolutions this practice violates.62  Instead, the full measure of international
law needs to be applied to eliminate the sense of impunity enjoyed by those who use child
soldiers.63 This impunity can be challenged through national courts, ad hoc tribunals, and the
International Criminal Court (ICC).64 For instance, in May of 2004, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone issued a landmark decision finding that an individual may be held criminally responsible
for the offense of recruiting child soldiers into armed conflict.65  The Special Court was the first
international criminal body to indict a person for the crime of recruiting and using children in
war and also the first to deliver an international conviction associated with the practice.66 As case
law, this landmark decision now joins a host of international treaties that prohibit the practice of
                                                 
57 Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, supra note 34, at 76.
58 Id.  “With respect to Iran, publicity had no effect at all, whereas in El Salvador the opposite was more often true.
Sometimes an armed group will recognize that using children is not militarily or strategically beneficial, while at
other times, as in Mozambique, the opposite applied.”
59 Id at 77.
60 Becker, supra note 12, at 18.
61 Singer, supra note 7, at 575.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Becker, supra note 12, at 18.
65 Noah B. Novogrodsky, Litigating Child Recruitment before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 7 San Diego Int’l
L.J. 421(2006).
66 Id at 421, 423.
10
recruiting child soldiers.67  More recently, the ICC issued its first indictment in July of 2005
against Joseph Kony, the rebel leader of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, and five
of his commanders.68 On March 17, 2006, the ICC made its first arrest. 69  Mr. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, founder and leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) was arrested and transferred
to the ICC.70  Thomas Lubanga is alleged to have committed war crimes, as set out in Article 8
of the Statute, in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo since July of 2002.71  In
short, legal action can act as a deterrent, but whether such prosecution would take place
ultimately depends on political will, which in turn is influenced by public opinion.72
In an effort to eliminate forced recruitment, proper recruitment procedures should be
established by governments.73  Implementing Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), which provides for registration after birth, would help ensure that under-age
children were not recruited.74  Governments should have effective systems of birth registration
and documentation of children’s age in order to stop the use of children as soldiers.  In addition,
the proliferation of weapons, especially light weight weapons that are easy to handle by children,
should be curbed.75  Moreover, evacuating children from war zones and creating safe havens
                                                 
67 Id. at 424.
68 Press release, First Arrest for the International Criminal Court, March 17, 2006, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressreleases/114.html
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72Stuart Malsen, Relevance of the Convention on the Rights of the Child to Children in armed Conflict, 6 Transnat’l
L. & Contemp. Probs. 329, 344 (1996).
73 Alison Dundes Renteln, The Child Soldier: The Challenge of Enforcing International Standards, 21 Whittier L.
Rev. 191, 203-204 (1999).
74 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, at art. 7, 1577 U.N.T.S.3.  “The child shall be registered
immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as
possible, the right to be cared for by his or her parents.”
75 Malsen, supra note 72, at 344.
11
would minimize the impact of war on them and would also protect them from being forcibly
recruited.76
In order to gain universal respect for human rights and consequently eliminate forced
recruitment, dissemination of information in relation to the protection and treatment of children
during armed conflict should be made available to all sections of the community.77  Educating
parents and local communities about national and international laws pertaining to the use of child
soldiers would also strengthen the capacity for advocacy.78  Increased awareness and support for
banning children in combat would create an atmosphere where it is harder for any group to use
children in combat.79 National and international non-governmental organizations play an
important role in monitoring and reporting responsibilities.80  Information relating to child
soldiers such as reports on the practices of governments and non-government entities could be
shared on a network basis, thereby encouraging the development of cross-regional and cross-
international strategies.81
B. Voluntary Participation
While children may be forcibly recruited by both government armies and opposition
groups, they are sometimes the first to voluntarily join these groups.82  Their motivation lies in
the social, economic, and political issues defining their lives.83 Experts have estimated that
voluntarily participation exceeds forced recruitment.84  The term “voluntary” in reference to the
                                                 
76 Renteln, supra note 73, at 204.
77 Id at 342.
78 Id.
79 Hackenberg, supra note 2, at 447.
80 Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, supra note 34, at 180-181.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Barbara Fontana, Child Soldiers and International Law, African Security Review, Vol.6, No. 3, (1997).
12
use of child soldiers is questionable, given the brutal conditions that motivate children to join
armed forces.85 Children volunteer for the armed forces because of what they have experienced
personally: poverty, death, loss, displacement, religious motivations, need for revenge, and
collapse of social structure.86  In response to these experiences, children find themselves
volunteering with armed groups.87  In addition, children’s surroundings influence their decision
to volunteer in armed conflict.88  A child’s social environment influences the way they see
things.89  Families, peer groups, and religious or other community-based groups may exert
pressure that leads or encourages children to join armed hostilities.90  A child’s surrounding has
an impact on a child’s decision to participate in hostilities.91  For example, if a community’s
perception of war is based on ethnic cleansing or religious fanaticism, this perception is passed
on to the child, who in turn feels motivated and justified to participate in effecting a change in
ethnicity by volunteering their services in armed conflict.92  Also, peer pressure, hopelessness,
family loss, desires for revenge, and the loss of a support structure makes joining an armed group
seem like a better alternative.93 Lastly, conflicts leave children orphaned, displaced, or
responsible as heads of household when one or both parents are killed or are away fighting.94
Schools, which would otherwise occupy their time, are closed or destroyed, and the fields they
would otherwise cultivate are off-limits because of mines.95  Children who find themselves in
                                                 
85 Morisseau, supra note 24, at 1280.
86 Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, supra note 34, at 32, 168.
87 Id. at 173.
88 Id. at 37-43, 168-169.
89 Id.
90 Id; Abbott, supra note 19, at 517: In some cultures, giving a child as a volunteer is viewed as noble.  For example,
in Sri Lanka, the community viewed child soldiers as heroes and received special favors, which included tax
exemptions and preferential treatment at job interviews.
91 See Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, supra note 34, at 37-43, 168-169.
92 Id. at 23.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
13
this vulnerable situation face the risk of being recruited or being receptive to ideological
propaganda which encourages them to join armed groups.96
Preventing Voluntary Participation
As mentioned earlier, what motivates children to participate in armed conflict lies deep in
the roots of the conflict, and in the social, economic, and political issues defining their lives.97
Only by determining and addressing the root causes of voluntary participation can constructive
solutions be found to help prevent children from volunteering in armed conflict.98 Preventative
strategies aimed at reducing child volunteerism include interventions aimed at structural reform,
interventions aimed at changing perceptions of the value of participation held by children and
those around them, interventions that counter children’s feelings of helplessness, vulnerability,
and frustration, and demobilization.99
Structural reform interventions may include elimination or improvement of the structural
causes of negative personal experience which may be targeted by providing alternative social
institutions.100  Interventions aimed at targeting children’s appraisal of participation in hostilities
should be directed both to the children and to those around them by convincing them of the
negative consequences of participation.101  This should in turn convince adults to prevent their
children from volunteering.102  Advocacy taking this approach should include moral arguments
based on religion, local culture, history, and morals.103 Adult’s perceptions and values of war
should be taken into account so as to effect a change in children’s perceptions and values of
                                                 
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 79-80.
102 Id.
14
war.104 Alternative activities like educational opportunities, socio-economic improvement, and
physical and psychosocial rehabilitation would go a long way in the process.105
Feelings of helplessness and vulnerability are often not problems of perception; therefore,
the solution is not only a matter of making children feel empowered and secure but also of
reducing their oppression and improving their capacity to effect change without joining armed
forces.106  Interventions aimed at instilling feelings of competence, security, and strength involve
providing alternatives for children in war zones.107  For example, leaving schools open during
conflicts would make children less bored, frustrated, and desperate.108  Children would be less
attracted to joining armed forces if schools were kept open during hostilities.109  However, this is
not always the case because keeping children in school during hostilities can also help facilitate
recruitment by opposition armed forces.110
Encouraging demobilization of child soldiers would more likely than not reduce or
prevent children from volunteering in the future.  After children volunteer their services, they
usually regret their decision but find that they cannot leave the armed group safely.111  Deserters
are shot on the spot or beaten in front of other troops.112 Even those who escape live in fear of
being detained by the police, while their families are subject to harassment and threats.113
Improved socio-economic conditions are often a factor that encourages young soldiers to
                                                                                                                                                              
103 Id. at 80-81.
104 Id. at 172.
105 Id. at 173.
106 Id. at 81.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
15
demobilize.114  Also, since some of the child soldiers fear retribution for the acts carried out by
them during conflicts, amnesty offers may persuade them to surrender their arms and leave the
armed group.115  However, this may not always be the case as was seen in Liberia where amnesty
offers did not automatically lead to demobilization.116  Provision of care for the homeless and
orphaned and physical and psychological rehabilitation might also facilitate demobilization.117
Demobilization has to be linked with development initiatives so as to successfully prevent child
soldiers from volunteering again in the future.118  In summary, only by examining the different
situations and taking account of the experience of others can the factors producing voluntary
involvement be dealt with.119
C. Consequences of Participation in Armed Conflict
The growth and development of children are continuing processes that require essential
nutrients, psychological stimuli, and social interactions.120  Obstacles that interrupt or block this
normal progression can have serious implications on the physical and mental well-being of a
child.121  The recruitment and abduction of children into armed forces is one of the most
disruptive obstacles to the healthy development of children.122  Children that are recruited are
robbed of a normal life and are denied a normal education, which is essential for their
development and promotion of self-esteem.123
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Customary international law is violated whether children become soldiers voluntarily or
as a result of forced recruitment.124 Exposure to armed conflict through direct participation or via
the resulting breakdown of community support systems traumatizes childhood development.125
Malnutrition, disease, sexual exploitation, mental abuse, and physical injury are some of the
many hardships faced by child soldiers.126
Child soldiers are subjected to dangerous risks, some of which are beyond the normal
perils of war.127  They are made to walk across fields ahead of their abductors and to plant
landmines or clear fields of landmines, and therefore are the first to die if they miss a mine.128
Child soldiers are forced to suffer the rigors of military life.129  The younger children collapse
under the heavy loads. Malnutrition, respiratory and skin infections, and other ailments are
frequent.130   Child soldiers face the additional risk of drug and alcohol abuse, which is often
used to desensitize them from violence.131
Girl soldiers are particularly at risk of sexual exploitation.132  They are raped, abducted
for sexual exploitation, and forced into marriages or prostitution.133  Sexual exploitation has a
devastating impact on the physical and emotional development of the victim.134  Unwanted and
unsafe sex is most likely to result in unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases like
HIV/AIDS, which affect the immediate and future sexual reproductive health of the girl and the
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mortality of the girl child soldier.135  Girls that have been repeatedly raped face the risk of
chronic pelvic inflammatory disease and death.136  Some commit suicide because of the
humiliation they suffer, while others flee from their homes leading to ostracism and further
displacement.137
Besides the risks of death or physical injury in combat, child soldiers also suffer
psychosocial consequences of participation.  Under the CRC, every child is entitled to receive
such “protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being,” and State Parties are obliged
to “ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child.”138 Child
soldiers that have suffered traumatic experiences like executions and violent acts experience
nightmares and flashbacks.139 They live in fear of rejection and in fear of legal or physical
retribution for the acts they committed during conflict.140  Sometimes families or communities
reject former child soldiers because of the abuses they carried out during conflicts or because the
family or community fears violent retribution for the acts committed by the child soldier.141
Children who have perpetrated or fallen victim to extreme violence need to receive
psychological treatment.142  Successful recovery programs allow children to resume their normal
childhood while learning to live in an environment of peace.143
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Addressing the Consequences of Child Recruitment and Participation
The preamble to the CRC provides that, “the child should be fully prepared to live an
individual life in society, and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the United
Nations, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and
solidarity.”144 The 1977 Additional Protocols further confirm the special protection afforded
children by providing that, “Children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected
against any form of indecent assault.”145
In seeking to ensure that the consequences suffered by child soldiers are addressed, the
sources of obligation must be clarified and those responsible for addressing the consequences
should be identified.146  Unfortunately, international humanitarian law is not always clear in this
area.147  In addition, questions that cannot be answered once and for all are questions like who
should intervene, when and how.148  The responsibility to protect or respond to the needs of child
soldiers falls on States and non governmental entities, who may be parties or adherents to
international instruments, parties to the conflict, subjects of national law, and others who are
bound by customary international law.149  However, fulfillment of the formal requirements is
complicated by the lack of political will and the availability of only limited resources because of
conflicts.150  Certain obligations like physical integrity, humane treatment, and freedom from
torture are never dependent on the availability of resources but must be fulfilled by all parties
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concerned.151   In short, addressing the consequences of child participation in armed conflict
takes place both at national and international levels.152  For instance, dealing with psychosocial
and physical consequences of children’s participation in conflict usually takes place at the
national and community level.153  Nonetheless, international legal obligations do offer general
principles and a framework for action.154  The two 1997 Additional Protocols require parties to
the conflict to provide children “with the care and aid they require, whether because of their age
or any other reason.”155  The reference to ‘age or any other reason’ may be interpreted to include
trauma due to recruitment;  thus, this may imply that there is an obligation on parties to provide
rehabilitatative services.156  The CRC further confirms States’ obligations by providing that,
“State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote the physical and psychological
recovery and social re-integration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or
abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or
armed conflicts.”157  “Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an environment which
fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child.”158  In practice, however, providing
rehabilitation services to ex-child combatants is not that easily achieved since conflict often
coincides with the breakdown of community programs and support systems.159
In addition, responsive programs dealing with the psychosocial and physical
consequences of child participation in conflict should be developed and executed.160  In
developing these programs, incorporation of traditional practices, values, and beliefs should be
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considered.161 Programs or policies that offer incentives for child soldiers to demobilize and
reintegrate are important and help reduce delinquency and dissatisfaction of former child
soldiers.162
Education, as part of the demobilization and reintegration package, would help former
child soldiers reenter society and would give them purpose.163  Unfortunately, most child soldiers
that have spent their school-age years as combatants are likely to be more interested in earning
money once they hand over their guns.164  In such cases, programs that provide vocational
training, industrial skills training, or agricultural skills training should be designed and
executed.165  Such skills training combined with a loan enable them to establish their own
businesses and financial independence, thus bringing about successful reintegration in society.166
Article 28 of the CRC recognizes a child’s right to education, and obliges State Parties to take
various steps to ensure that the right is achieved, “progressively and on the basis of equal
opportunity.”167
Forgiveness and reconciliation are also a step that should be considered when dealing
with reintegration and rehabilitation of former child soldiers.168  Most child soldiers commit
heinous crimes against civilians, including family members and neighbors during conflicts.169
Former child soldiers’ reintegration into society and transition to civilian life is obviously
difficult for both the victims and the child soldiers.170  Former child soldiers need to be forgiven
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by society, and this can be done through efforts to help community members understand that
child soldiers are also victims.171  National level policy initiatives to ensure amnesty, family
reunification, and follow-up social support should be initiated in the name of reconciliation and
psychological healing.172  Public acknowledgment of human rights violations is an important
step toward national reconciliation.173
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS
International law governing children may be found in the broad realm of human rights
law encompassed in treaties, international humanitarian law, customary international law, and in
the laws and practices of individual States.174 Until recently, the prevailing legal standard in
international law, established in the 1977 Additional Protocols of the Geneva Convention and the
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, was that children as young as fifteen could be
legally recruited and used in combat.175  This standard is weak considering that in other aspects
of the Convention on the Rights of a Child a child is defined as anyone under the age of eighteen
and is entitled to special protections.176  The weak legal standard and continued wide spread of
the use of child soldiers in the 1990's prompted an international group of geographically diverse
NGO’s, the Coalition to stop the Use of Child Soldiers, to campaign for stronger laws relative to
the use of child soldiers177  The campaigns ultimately led to three new treaties that significantly
strengthened the legal norms regarding the use of child soldiers.178  The 1998 Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, adopted by 120 governments, made the practice of
conscripting, enlisting, or using children  under the age of fifteen in hostilities a war crime.179  In
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June of 1999, the International Labor Organization adopted the Worst Forms of Child Labor
Convention (Convention 182), which prohibited the forced recruitment of children under the age
of eighteen for use in armed conflict.180  In May of 2000, the United Nations adopted the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children
in Armed Conflict, establishing eighteen as the minimum age for participation in armed conflict,
for compulsory or forced recruitment, and for any recruitment by non-governmental armed
groups.181 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, although only a regional
treaty, also established eighteen as a minimum age for recruitment and participation in
hostilities.182
A. The Limited Scope of International Humanitarian Law Relative to the use of Child
Soldiers.
International humanitarian law is the body of law that establishes rules that seek to limit
the effects of armed conflict by protecting non-combatants and by restricting the means and
methods of warfare.183 International humanitarian law is codified in the four 1949 Geneva
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Conventions and the two 1977 Additional Protocols.184 As shall be discussed below, the scope of
international humanitarian law relative to the use of children in armed conflict is rather limited,
especially in conflicts of a non-international nature.  The 1949 Geneva Conventions anticipate
two types of conflicts: “all cases of declared war or of any armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized
by one of them,”185 and “the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”186  In short, the 1949 Geneva Conventions
anticipate both international and non-international conflicts.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to internal armed conflicts and sets
out basic protections which apply to “persons taking no active part in the conflict.”187 Because
Common Article 3 affords protections to persons taking no active part in conflicts, persons who
take a direct part in hostilities fall outside the ambit of this protection, thus losing all protection
guaranteed under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.188  Therefore, since Common
Article 3 does not explicitly address the issue of child combatants, children who directly
participate in armed conflicts are not protected by the Geneva Conventions, thus falling between
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the gaps of international humanitarian law.189 However, where there are gaps or contradictions in
international humanitarian law, the long-standing Martens Clause recalls and confirms the most
basic standard:190  “ In cases not covered by specific international agreements, civilians and
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law
derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public
conscience."191  This position is supported by the International Law Commission  and is restated,
verbatim, in Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol I.192  The Martens Clause is important because
through its reference to customary law, it stresses the importance of customary norms in the
regulation of armed conflict.193
Another problem with the application of Common Article 3 relates to the refusal of States
to admit its applicability.194  According to some, the lack of a clear definition of armed conflict
in Common Article 3 “gave rise to a great number of interpretations and its applicability was
often denied.”195  However, because the obligations contained in Common Article 3 are
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considered customary international law, “rebels and governments against which they fight are
always bound by the duties and obligations of Common Article 3,” regardless of whether they
deny its applicability.196 Nevertheless, the four Geneva Conventions, despite their good
intentions, fail to adequately protect child soldiers, especially those in internal armed conflict.
The 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions were the first international
instruments to regulate the role of children in armed conflict.197 Additional Protocol I, which
applies to conflicts of an international nature, obligates parties to the conflict to “take all feasible
measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct
part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed
forces.”198 Also, “in recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years
but who have not attained the age of eighteen years the parties to the conflict shall endeavor to
give priority to those who are oldest.”199
The use of the term “feasible measures” makes claiming that keeping children out of the
conflict was unfeasible easy for State Parties.200 This formulation is less mandatory than that
proposed in the Diplomatic Conference by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
which would have obliged parties to take “all necessary measures” to prevent participation.201  In
addition, the flexible restriction on the acceptance of voluntary service is to the extent that
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indirect voluntary participation of children under fifteen in hostilities would not involve any
breach of Article 77 of Additional Protocol I.202
The text’s reference to taking a ‘direct’ part in hostilities could lead to the conclusion that
indirect acts of participation are not covered.203 The ICRC’s draft article, which did not include
this word, would have prohibited even indirect participation, such as the transmission of military
information, transport of arms and supplies, and provisions of supplies.204  Lastly, the terms of
the treaty only apply to one or both of the parties that has ratified it or expressed the intent to be
bound by it.205
Additional Protocol II develops and supplements Common Article 3 to the Geneva
Conventions without modifying the existing conditions of application.206 Like Common Article
3, Additional Protocol II applies to non-international armed conflicts.207  However, “Protocol II
only applies to conflicts of a certain degree of intensity and does not have exactly the same field
of application as Common Article 3, which applies in all situations of non-international armed
conflict.”208 The application of Additional Protocol II is often obstructed by threshold issues.  As
stated above, Additional Protocol II only applies to internal conflicts that reach a certain level of
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intensity, and where the opposition armed forces meet the criteria of responsible command and
control over the territory, and where there is capacity to implement the Protocol.209 Furthermore,
“This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts.”210 Because of Additional Protocol II’s high threshold application, States are able to
deny that their internal conflicts are covered by claiming that their conflicts are merely internal
disturbances, riots, or sporadic acts.211 At present, there is no international body that determines
which non-international conflicts meet the conditions necessary for the application of Protocol II
and which do not.212  Therefore, the minimal conditions of Common Article 3 of the four Geneva
Conventions, human rights law provisions that are not subject to derogation, and local law
govern the conflict when the conflict does not meet the applicability requirements of Additional
Protocol II.213
Additional Protocol II extends its protections to children involved in non-international
armed conflicts by providing that “children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall
neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities.”214 This
total prohibition is stronger than that in Protocol I, since it prohibits voluntary enlistment and
indirect participation.215  That is to say, “not only can a child not be recruited or enlist himself,
but furthermore, he will not be "allowed to take part in hostilities", i.e., to participate in military
operations such as gathering information, transmitting orders, transporting ammunition and
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foodstuffs, or acts of sabotage.”216 Moreover, Additional Protocol II extends special protections
to children in conflict by providing that children who have not attained the age of fifteen, who
end up participating in hostilities despite the provisions of sub-paragraph c, shall continue to
enjoy the special protections afforded them by Article 4.217
Unfortunately for the child soldier, Protocol I and II do not establish minimum
humanitarian standards of treatment that ought to apply to those children that participate in
armed conflict, but instead focuses on the unrealistic ban on their participation in war.218
Although the Protocols prohibit the recruitment and participation of children less than fifteen-
years-old in armed conflict, those who do decide to participate are recognized as combatants and
lose the protections afforded civilians under international humanitarian law.219  However, as
mentioned above, these children continue to enjoy the special protections provided by Article
4(d) if they participate in hostilities.220  Nevertheless, States will only be bound by Additional
Protocol II if they have ratified the treaty or have made a valid unilateral declaration of intent to
respect the rules of international humanitarian law.221 Other armed groups, however, will be
bound by the rules of customary international law relating to the conduct of hostilities and
treatment of vulnerable groups, such as children.222
In summary, international humanitarian law, as it stands today, is incapable of reaching
children involved in armed conflicts, especially conflicts of a non- international nature.  There
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are no international conflicts today in which children are fighting to which Additional Protocol I
would apply.223  Most of the conflicts children are involved in today are internal in nature and
because of the high threshold issues in Additional Protocol II, children participating in internal
conflicts cannot benefit from it.224  Also, Additional Protocol II is rarely ratified by the State in
conflict, and Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions places no restrictions on the
recruitment or participation of children in armed conflict.225  The failure of international
humanitarian law to reach children involved in armed conflict prompted the development of
other international and regional standards in other arenas.226
B. Attempts to Improve International Legal Standards Relative to Child Soldiers through
the Adoption of Human Rights Instruments
International human rights law is a body of rules primarily regulating the rights and
obligations individuals owe to one another as members of a collective society.227 Generally,
international human rights law seeks to prevent as well as punish breaches of its provisions and
accordingly creates specific rights and responsibilities for States as well as individuals.
However, most human rights treaties that protect children are not self-executing, and therefore
require domestic legislation to create a private cause of action.228  Nevertheless, signatories of
these treaties have a responsibility to observe them with good faith and scrupulous care.229
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The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides children with protection
during times of war and peace.230 The CRC became the most ratified human rights treaty in
history with 191 of the 193 participating nations ratifying it at record-breaking rates.231 The CRC
addresses the use of child soldiers by providing that “State Parties undertake to respect and to
ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts
which are relevant to the child.”232 The “law applicable to them” must include not only treaties to
which States are parties but also relevant rules of customary international law.233 Although these
rules of customary international law are unclear, both international and domestic laws prohibit
certain acts.234
Despite the widespread global acceptance of the CRC, several imperfections render it
incapable of protecting children in armed conflict.235 Article 38 has been subject to considerable
criticism.236  First, it is the only provision in the Convention that deviates from the general age
limit of eighteen.237 Specifically, while Article 1 of the Convention defines a child as everyone
under the age of eighteen, Article 38 redefines a child as everyone under the age of fifteen for
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purposes of recruitment and participation in armed conflict.238 Second, with respect to the
prohibition against recruitment and participation, Article 38 is mostly confined to repeating
Article 77 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.239 In so doing, it not only brought
nothing new, but could also detract attention from the stronger standard contained in Additional
Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, which provides a more absolute prohibition for the use of
child soldiers in non-international armed conflicts.240
Furthermore, the CRC has a large number of reservations.241 Reservations like these
weaken the requirements of the CRC.242 International human rights law, especially that
concerning the world’s children, becomes meaningless if States bound by it are permitted to pick
and chose those provisions they will abide by and those they will not.243
In addition, the CRC has no enforcement mechanisms, therefore making its enforceability
dependent upon the domestic laws of each nation.244 However, the CRC has an implementation
mechanism that uses a periodic reporting system by the State Parties to the Committee on the
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Rights of the Child, which monitors implementation of the provisions recognized in the CRC.245
The Committee can make suggestions and other forms of constructive criticism to the State Party
but it cannot punish non-compliance or force compliance even though compliance is requested
by the Committee.246
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict
In light of the growing awareness and concern within the international community of the
plight of children affected by armed conflict, an initiative was taken to campaign for the adoption
of an Optional Protocol to the CRC that would raise the minimum age of recruitment and
participation in hostilities to eighteen years. 247 The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, adopted on May 25,
2000, generally strengthens protection for children in armed conflict: it establishes an
international standard for the employment of children in armed conflict; it codifies a legal norm
by which States can be held accountable; it sets a minimum age requirement that makes it more
difficult for governments and non-state actors to fabricate the ages of children employed in
armed conflict; it encourages States to implement existing national laws and policies or enact
domestic standards that will reflect the standards enunciated in the statute; and it raises public
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awareness regarding the use of child soldiers.248 However, the Optional Protocol is not flawless.
Most of its pitfalls, which will be discussed below, are on account of its vagueness, which affects
its effectiveness.
Examining the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
Article 1: State Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed
forces who have not attained the age of 18 do not take a direct part in hostilities.249
This is probably considered the most important article in the Optional Protocol since it
raises the minimum age for participation in hostilities from fifteen to eighteen and therefore
represents an improvement of the present protection provided by international law.250  Raising
the age of participation in hostilities from fifteen to eighteen has a number of advantages for
child soldiers.
First, in the context of international armed conflict, children between fifteen and eighteen
years of age who are recruited into the armed forces are no longer entitled to protection against
the effects of hostilities as members of the civilian population but are instead considered
combatants within the meaning of Article 43 of Additional Protocol I and the Geneva
Convention Relative to the protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War.251  Raising the
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minimum age to eighteen guarantees such children the protection the civilian population is
entitled to in international armed conflicts.252
Second, in the context of non-international armed conflicts, a step like this constitutes
progress.253  Article 4, paragraph 3(d), guarantees protection for children under the age of fifteen
who have taken part in hostilities despite the prohibition stipulated in Article 4, paragraph 3(c),
of Additional Protocol II.254  However, this special protection is not expressly stipulated for
children between fifteen and eighteen years of age.255 Also, neither Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions nor its Additional Protocol II contains a provision similar to that of Article
77(2) of Additional Protocol I:  “. . . In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age
of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict
shall endeavor to give priority to those who are oldest.”256 Thus, raising the age limit to eighteen
for purposes of participation in hostilities guarantees children in non-international armed
conflicts protection. Moreover, in practice, especially in cases where children do not have birth
certificates, raising the age limit to eighteen makes it hard for superiors to pass children off as
being older than they really are, since their physical appearance speaks for itself.257 This is
especially important since many reports have shown that persons under the age of eighteen have
not attained the physical and intellectual maturity which would enable them to cope with the
harsh realities of armed conflict.258  Other instruments that represent a raised age limit of
eighteen for participation in hostilities are the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
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the Child and the 1999 International Labor Organization Convention (182) on the Prohibition of
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.259
The positive changes Article I of the Optional Protocol brings to children in armed
conflict do not render this particular Article flawless.  As regards the age limit, Article 1 of the
CRC, whose wording is repeated in the preamble of the Optional Protocol, stipulates: “For the
purposes of that Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years
unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”260 However, there is a
restriction placed on this general principle by Article 38 of the CRC, the underlying Convention,
which stipulates fifteen as the minimum age for participation in hostilities.261  This restriction
provides children in situations of armed conflict a lower level of protection and places their
rights in even greater danger.
As regards the scope of the obligation in Article 1, two weaknesses must be mentioned.262
The first weakness relates to the obligation imposed on States: States have a duty to “take all
feasible measures to ensure” that persons who have not attained the age eighteen do not take part
in hostilities.263  This standard recognizes that, in exceptional circumstances, withholding or
withdrawing soldiers eighteen years of age or younger will not be “feasible.”264  As interpreted in
law of war treaties, including Geneva Protocol I, the term “feasible” has been understood to
mean that which is practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling
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at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.265  This Article would have
provided children better protection if States had undertaken to “take all necessary measures.”
The second weakness relates to the extent of the protection provided children against being
involved in hostilities.266  Specifically, children who have not attained the age of eighteen are
protected from taking a “direct part in hostilities.”267 This text, as mentioned above, is weaker
than the corresponding clause in Additional Protocol II, which precludes all participation by
stipulating that children shall not be allowed to “take part in hostilities.”268
The reference to “direct participation” weakens the protection conferred on children
because only a certain type of participation is covered, not participation in hostilities in
general.269 In the context of treaties relating to law of armed conflict, the term “direct
participation in hostilities” has been understood to mean a direct casual relationship between the
activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and place where the activity takes
place.270  In other words, ‘direct participation’ means, “acts of war which by their nature or
purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed
forces.”271 An important note is that direct participation does not include acts such as the
gathering and transmission of military information, the transportation of arms and munitions, the
provision of supplies, or other similar activities.272  Therefore, the involvement of children in
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these activities puts them at serious risk of physical injury and psychological trauma without
protection.
Article 2: State Parties shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are
not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces.
Raising the minimum age from fifteen to eighteen for compulsory recruitment also
represents an improvement from the previous standards.  The protection provided by Article 38,
paragraph 3, of the CRC and Article 77, paragraph 2, of Additional Protocol I against the forced
recruitment of children between fifteen and eighteen years of age is weak, since State Parties
“shall endeavor” only to give priority to those who are oldest.273
Article 3(1): States Parties shall raise in years the minimum age for the voluntary recruitment of
persons into their national armed forces from that set out in article 38, paragraph 3, of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, taking account of the principles contained in that article
and recognizing that under the Convention persons under the age of 18 years are entitled to
special protection.
(2) Each State Party shall deposit a binding declaration upon ratification of or accession to the
present Protocol that sets forth the minimum age at which it will permit voluntary recruitment
into its national armed forces and a description of the safeguards it has adopted to ensure that
such recruitment is not forced or coerced.
(3) States Parties that permit voluntary recruitment into their national armed forces under the
age of 18 years shall maintain safeguards to ensure, as a minimum, that:
(a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary;
                                                 
273 Helle, supra note 236.
39
(b) Such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the person’s parents or legal
guardians;
(c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such military service;
(d) Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national military service.
(4) Each State Party may strengthen its declaration at any time by notification to that effect
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall inform all States Parties.
Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received by the Secretary-General.
(5) The requirement to raise the age in paragraph 1 of the present article does not apply to
schools operated by or under the control of the armed forces of the States Parties, in keeping
with articles 28 and 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 3, which was seen as a big achievement, raises the minimum age for voluntary
recruitment from fifteen to sixteen years of age, in accordance with the declaration to be
submitted by States upon ratification or accession to the Optional Protocol.274  As noted, these
declarations may be strengthened at anytime but not weakened.275  Therefore, a declaration can
only be withdrawn in favor of a declaration specifying a higher minimum voluntary recruitment
age into the government armed forces and not a lower one.  Although raising the age limit from
fifteen to sixteen years is a welcome development, Article 3 weakens the protection provided by
the entire Optional Protocol, especially Article 2, because, in practice, determining whether child
soldiers have been voluntarily recruited may be difficult.276  This is especially true since
experience shows that voluntary recruitment is rarely based solely on the will of the child but is
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conditioned by factors beyond his or her control.277  The safeguards included to ensure that
recruitment is indeed voluntary and that no child under the minimum age is recruited are positive
features of the provision.278  However, these safeguards may be difficult to implement in practice
since in developing countries affected by armed conflict, proving the age of the child is difficult
given that birth registration systems often do not exist.279  In addition, the requirement to raise
the age for voluntary recruitment in paragraph 1 does not apply to schools operated by or under
control of the armed forces.280  The wording of the provision allows for the possibility of
circumventing the age limit by considering such students as members of the armed forces and
thus as military targets.281
Article 4(1). Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under
any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.
(2). States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, including
the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices.
(3). The application of the present article shall not affect the legal status of any party to an
armed conflict.
According to this provision, non-State entities are prohibited from recruiting children
either forcibly or voluntarily.  Furthermore, they are not allowed to let children participate in
hostilities, whether in a direct or indirect manner.282  This is a positive provision, since it
demonstrates the willingness of States to regulate the behavior of non-State entities, and thus
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also address the situations of non-international armed conflict.283  However, the potential
effectiveness of Article 4 in preventing the recruitment and participation of children in situations
of internal armed conflict is questionable, mainly because the wording “should not” rather than
“shall not,” seems to impose a moral, as opposed to a legal, obligation under international law.284
The reason for the wording was mainly because many States, during negotiations, opposed
departing from the traditional approach of human rights law under which human rights law is
only binding on States, whereas the behavior of non-State entities is regulated by domestic
law.285  However, the criminal repression under domestic law which Article 4 provides for is
likely to have little or no deterrent effect because those who take up arms against a legitimate
government have already exposed themselves to the most severe penalties of the law; thus, the
threat of additional penal sanctions for recruiting children is likely to be inconsequential.286
Also, in many contemporary situations of non-international armed conflict, governments’
capacity to enforce their domestic law may be limited.287  Some have argued that providing a
direct legal obligation on non-State entities would have been feasible under the Optional
Protocol by defining recruitment and use in hostilities of persons under the age of eighteen years
as a crime under international law.288  Alternatively, providing this obligation on non-State
entities could have been achieved by incorporating part of international humanitarian law in the
Optional Protocol, so that the legal responsibility of non-State entities was limited to situations
                                                 
283 Id.  The ICRC supported including the issue of non-State entities in the Optional Protocol, given that the
involvement of children in non-international armed conflicts is equally as deadly and traumatizing for children in
international conflicts.
284 Id.
285 Id; Dennis, supra note 264, at 792.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. The Rome Statute makes the recruitment and participation of children under 15 (not 18) a crime under
international law. See supra text accompanying note 179.
42
of armed conflict.289  However, many of the States were opposed to including an obligation for
non-state groups in an international human rights instrument like the Optional Protocol because
they did not want to equate rebel groups with State Parties or confer recognition on them.290
The obligation imposed on non-State entities in Article 4 is different from and is wider
than that imposed on States and therefore casts doubt on the effectiveness of Article 4.291  This
provision may be considered by non-State entities as a “double standard” and consequently that
the moral force of the norm imposed upon them is weak.292  Accordingly, non-State entities may
feel that they are not bound by the provision and thus not respect it.293  An important note in this
regard that one rule of international humanitarian law is that the parties to a conflict must be
treated on an equal footing, and likewise, there must be equal obligations on all sides.294  This
argument has often been put forward when seeking to induce parties to a conflict to implement
the law.295  The Optional Protocol’s failure to encourage adherence from non-State entities and
the exclusion of non-State entities in crafting the content of the Statute makes persuading their
adherence difficult.296
More generally speaking, the Optional Protocol breaks from standard international
norms.297  Usually, a state must ratify the underlying instrument, in this case the CRC, in order to
ratify its optional additions.298  The Optional Protocol allows for States that have not ratified the
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CRC, for example, the United States, to ratify it, which undermines the spirit of the CRC.299
Although there are advantages to allowing States to commit to the Optional Protocol even where
such States are unwilling to accept all the terms of the underlying Convention, some argue that
this loophole downgrades the significance of the Convention.300
Despite the weaknesses mentioned above, the Optional Protocol represents progress and
serves to consolidate existing international law concerning the protection of children from
recruitment and participation in hostilities.
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
In 1990, the Organization of African Unity adopted the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child.301 The Charter, in no uncertain terms, offers protection to children involved
in armed conflict by providing that “State Parties to this Charter shall undertake to respect and
ensure respect for the rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts which
affect the child.”302 State Parties are also instructed to “take all necessary measures to ensure that
no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and shall refrain, in particular, from recruiting any
child.”303 Although the Charter is only a regional instrument, it is far more reaching than the
CRC.  Unlike the CRC, the Charter recognizes that a child is anyone below eighteen,including
those involved in armed conflict.304 Also, unlike Additional Protocol II, the Charter applies to
internal skirmishes, tension, and strife and therefore recognizes that the rights and welfare of a
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child are of more value than the type of conflict they are involved in.305 Moreover, the Charter
uses stronger language (necessary measures) than the CRC (feasible measures) in ensuring State
Parties’ protection of children involved in armed conflict.306 The Charter’s implementation
mechanism, which is very similar to that of the CRC in that it has a similar reporting system,307
accepts complaints from non-party States, individuals, organizations, and non-governmental
organizations.308
Despite its good intentions, the Charter has shortcomings.  First, the Charter is only
binding on States that have ratified it.309 Second, “Any custom, tradition, cultural, or religious
practice that is inconsistent with the rights and obligations contained in the present Charter shall
to the extent of such inconsistency be null and void.”310 This provision leaves it open for State
Parties to use cultural or religious inconsistencies with the African Charter as a pretext for non-
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compliance with the Charter.311 Regardless of these shortcomings, the Charter compliments the
CRC and international humanitarian law concerning child soldiers, in particular those involved
in internal conflicts.
Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the
Worst Forms of Child Labor (Convention 182)
In June of 1999, the International Labor Organization adopted a Convention Concerning
the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor
(Convention 182).312 The Convention commits each state that ratifies it to “take immediate and
effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor as a
matter of urgency.”313  Article 2 of Convention 182 defines a child as anyone under eighteen-
years-old.314   Convention 182 further provides that the term “worst forms of child labor”
includes: “All forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of
children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labor, including forced or
compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict.”315  In addition, “worst forms of
child labor” also includes, “work which, by its nature or circumstances in which it is carried out,
is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.”316 In implementing the provisions of
the Convention, the Convention leaves to State authorities to determine, after consultation with
associations of workers and employees, what should be considered as work harmful, unsafe, or
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immoral to the health of children below eighteen years of age.317  Convention 182 was the first
international treaty that set an eighteen-year minimum age limit in relation to child soldiering.318
It was also the first legal recognition of child soldiering as a form of child labor.319  The main
drawback of Convention 182 is that it does not prohibit voluntary recruitment but only forced
and compulsory recruitment.320  Therefore, children under eighteen years of age who volunteer
to participate in armed conflict are not protected by Convention 182.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
Besides international humanitarian law, human rights law, and labor law, regulating the
use of child soldiers in armed conflict, international criminal law plays a vital role in punishing
those that violate these rules.  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is one
of the instruments created by the international community that pertains to a child soldier’s legal
status and addresses criminal acts that are not limited by territorial boundaries.321  The Rome
Statute gives the court the jurisdiction to prosecute anyone who conscripts or enlists children
below fifteen years of age or uses them to participate actively in both international armed
conflicts and internal hostilities.322  The “commanding authority doctrine,” codified in the Rome
Statute, gives the ICC’s jurisdiction to reach those who order children to commit crimes.323
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The question as to whether child soldiers committing crimes are victims or criminals is
one issue with which the international community has had to struggle.324  This is an uneasy
question because of the uncertainty of where international law, humanitarian law, and human
rights law stands in relation to this matter.325  This uncertainty and lack of clarity is based on the
premise that children can not form the requisite mens rea to commit crimes of genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity.326  Adding to this is the fact that the international community
prefers rehabilitation as a way of handling child soldiers as opposed to taking a punitive
approach.327  The United Nations Secretary General’s proposal to create a special “juvenile
chamber” in the Sierra Leone Special Court, which would prosecute those between fifteen and
eighteen years of age that had committed war crimes, was severely criticized by non-
governmental organizations and human rights groups, resulting in its quick withdrawal.328  The
withdrawal of this proposal largely shows that the international community would rather
categorize child soldiers as victims and not criminals.329  On the other hand, those who have
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suffered atrocities at the hands of child soldiers often need to see their perpetrators held
accountable in some way or another.330  For example, after the Rwanda genocide, public opinion
favored holding children responsible.331  Many Rwandans believed that if a child was mature
enough to distinguish between a Tutsi and a Hutu and commit murder, then a child was mature
enough to be punished.332
Nevertheless, Article 26 of the ICC Statute provides that no one under eighteen years of
age at the time of commission of a war crime, crime against humanity, or genocide shall be tried
in the tribunal.333  This presumably means that an eighteen-year-old, who is considered a minor
under international law may volunteer to fight in combat and knowingly commit a war crime,
and yet not have to suffer criminal liability.334  However, supposedly, this does not stop any state
from prosecuting those who have committed war crimes when they were under eighteen-years-
old in their domestic courts.335
C. Narrowing the Gap between Progress in the Law and Progress on the Ground
Although there has been progress in developing the laws protecting child soldiers, as
discussed above, there has not been as much progress on the ground.   In theory, the laws
protecting child soldiers are stronger than ever before, but in practice, child soldiering continues
to thrive.  There is a gap between progress made on paper and progress made on the ground.
This chapter examines the reasons for this gap and how it can be bridged.
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Over the past two decades, the international child’s movement has spurred the
development of international law, policies and programs concerning child soldiers and has put
the concerns of child soldiers on the map.336 Since the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva
Convention,337 the CRC, 338 the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 339 the
International Labor Organization’s Convention No. 182 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms
of Child Labor,340 and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict have been implemented.341  For deterrence and
criminal responsibility, we have the Statute of the International Criminal Court and Country-
specific ad hoc tribunals that provide venues for addressing violations of law which preclude the
recruitment and use of children in armed conflict.342  In addition, the campaign to stop the use of
children as soldiers has led to a series of regional agreements, including: 1996 OAU Resolution
on the Plight of African Children in situation of Armed Conflicts, 1997 Cape Town Principles,
1998 European Parliament Resolution on Child Soldiers, 1999 Declaration by the Nordic
Foreign Ministers Against the use of Child Soldiers, 1999 Berlin Declaration on the use of
Children as Soldiers, 1999 Montevideo Declaration on the use of Children as Soldiers, 1999
Maputo Declaration on the use of Children as Soldiers, 2000 Organization of American States
(OAS) Resolution on Children and Armed Conflict, and 2001 Amman Declaration on the use of
Children as Soldiers.343
However, despite this strengthened legal regime, the improved monitoring and reporting
standards on the use of children as child soldiers has revealed an excessive use and increase in
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the practice.344  The Secretary General’s annual reports and country-specific reports to the
Security Council concerning child soldiers show that the situation is worsening.345  In 2001, the
Security Council requested that the Secretary General’s annual reports include a specific list of
governments and armed groups that recruit and use children in violation of international law.346
The Secretary General’s 2002 report to the Security Council listed twenty-three parties in five
countries that were in violation of their obligations.347  Moreover, the report also showed that
there was illegal recruitment of child soldiers by an additional seventeen parties in eight conflicts
that were not on the Security Council’s agenda.348  The Security Council took action by entering
dialogue with the violating parties, requesting that the violating parties provide information
regarding steps they had taken, and urging Member States to control the illicit trade of small
arms to the parties in violation of the relevant legal standards.349  Forty of the States mentioned
in the 2002 report were monitored throughout the following year.350  The 2003 Secretary
General’s reports revealed that all parties listed in the 2002 report continued to recruit and use
children as soldiers.351  In addition, there were a new total of over fifty-five parties. 352  The
Council considered the expanded list in an open debate on January 20, 2004 and issued a
resolution on April 22, 2004.353  The Secretary General’s report set out measures that the
Security Council might consider taking against parties who had made insufficient or no
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progress.354  These measures included imposing travel restrictions on leaders and excluding them
from governance structures and amnesty provisions, a banning of exports or supply of small
arms, banning of military assistance, and restricting the flow of financial resources to the parties
concerned.”355
The above is a demonstration of a pattern that has been going on for years.  The Secretary
General provides information and recommends steps, the Security Council affirms and reaffirms
its commitment to take firm steps, but the situation for children gets worse and few of the steps
identified are taken.356  As a result, progress in the law through adoption of new treaties and
passing of resolutions increases while progress on the ground is minimal or non-existent.  If the
gap between progress in the law and progress on the ground is to be narrowed, three tendencies
in the field of child rights in armed conflict need to be addressed by the international
community.357  These tendencies are: the tendency to focus more on developing human rights
law protecting child soldiers than on addressing the humanitarian reality on the ground; the
tendency to pursue advocacy and humanitarian programming without serious assessment of the
political, economic, and social dynamics driving a particular conflict; and the tendency to avoid
assessing the long term qualitative impact of the many and varied interventions that have been
made on behalf of war-affected children.  All three tendencies need to be addressed.
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The Human Rights vs. Humanitarian Impulse
Child rights advocates have focused heavily on the normative protection for children in armed
conflict, and, as discussed earlier, there has been great progress toward this goal.358  On the other
hand, discerning the progress on the humanitarian side is difficult since the number of child
soldiers is no different today from when the campaigning escalated a decade or so ago.359
During the child rights movement, child rights advocates focused on achieving a consensus on
the text of the Optional Protocol with slogans that did not address the complex root causes of the
use of child soldiers.360  The slogans simply called on States to “stop the recruitment of child
soldiers” by adopting a “straight-eighteen approach” to child soldiers that would prohibit the
voluntary or compulsory recruitment or use of anyone under eighteen years of age in armed
forces or groups.361  Many humanitarian agencies joined the advocacy groups in the Optional
Protocol campaign and failed to pose questions derived from practical facts they knew well from
their experience on the ground.362  For example, field-based organizations did not ask about the
likelihood of achieving compliance with a new standard when earlier domestic and international
standards were consistently violated.363  They did not ask if and how a new human rights legal
standard could reach the primary offenders in conflict settings and non-state armed groups, and if
or how the assignment of individual criminal responsibility to recruiters would stop children
from volunteering or alter the social, political, and economic factors at the root of
volunteerism.364  For the five years of the negotiations of the Optional Protocol, the childs rights
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movement failed to raise the hard questions and generate commitment that would have addressed
the harder realities underlying the problem.365
Advocacy without Conflict-Specific Analysis
Advocacy for child rights in armed conflict has been pursued not only with little attention
to what the humanitarian workers in the field know but also without sufficient analysis of the
political, social, economic, and military dynamics of particular conflicts.366 This can be a serious
obstacle to progress in concrete situations.  To generate compliance with commitment, the
child’s rights movement needs to go beyond slogans calling for compliance but should also delve
into the dynamics of each particular conflict.367  This can be achieved by building partnerships
with political scientists, economists, country analysts, bankers, and others that have a better
understanding of what is driving a particular conflict or warring party.368 For instance, the
Representative of the Secretary General for Armed Conflict, during his field visits, elicited
several commitments to end or restrict the use of child soldiers from non-governmental armed
groups.369  Members of the child rights movement have rallied behind these commitments,
calling for compliance and reports by monitoring groups, but they do not seem to have built
bridges with the relevant authorities.370  Child rights advocates need to network with political
scientists, economists, bankers, and corporate actors, who either have influence in or
understanding of what is driving a particular conflict or warring party, so that they can develop
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initiatives that compel compliance of commitments and that make non-compliance too costly for
a particular armed force or group to bear.371
Armed forces and groups have not complied with commitments to demobilize child
soldiers or to stop their recruitment, and all the armed forces or groups that made commitments
now appear on the Secretary-General’s lists of child soldiers recruiters.372  Pledges made by such
groups are rarely fulfilled.373  Many of these groups make pledges to stop using children as child
soldiers for public relations purposes but lack the political will and resources to follow
through.374
The child rights movement has been slow at building the necessary networks.375 The
child rights community must build partnerships with political scientists, country analysts, the
private sector, and others in order to develop specific initiatives likely to compel compliance
with child protection commitments and obligations.376
Failure to Assess the Long-Term Impact of Preventive or Responsive Interventions
Failure to stay long enough to assess the qualitative impact of interventions made on
behalf of war-affected children over the medium and long term hinders the ability of
humanitarian and human rights actors to advocate for particular programs, to guide the flow of
donor contributions, and to refer confidently to “best practices” or “lessons learned” in
programming for war-affected children.377  “We simply fail to stick around long enough to learn
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whether our programs have made a positive difference in the lives of children.”378  “How do we
know about which programs work or what assistance is appropriate?”379  Since the late 1980’s,
the international community has assisted in the demobilization of child soldiers, but there is still
a muddle of programs and approaches.380  For example, child soldiers who wanted to demobilize
in Sierra Leone were required to hand in a weapon to gain access to the program.381  Yet all UN
policy on child soldier demobilization stipulates that no gun requirement should be applied to
child soldiers because commanders are unlikely to demobilize child soldiers if they must give up
a weapon.382  In addition, child rights organizations disagree on whether children ought to be
reunited with their families immediately or housed for some period of time in interim care
centers where several services and opportunities are provided.383  Another question is if they
should stay in interim care centers, how long they should stay there is unclear.384  The issue of
how to best serve and assist girls who have served as soldiers, camp followers, wives or sexual
slaves of combatants or mothers of children of combatants into the demobilization and
reintegration process is unclear as well.385  The Optional Protocol requires States to provide
appropriate assistance.386
In summary, if these three tendencies are addressed, then the gap between law and reality
on the ground can hopefully be narrowed.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
The development of international standards concerning the involvement of children in
armed conflict has been significant.  The widespread acceptance of the Optional Protocol on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict has been a big step forward.  However, despite these
developments, protracted conflicts and the threat of new ones still call for vigilance and
commitment from the international community. Therefore, implementation, reporting, and
monitoring mechanisms of existing laws protecting child soldiers need to be strengthened and
more practical.  These laws need to be enforced to their full measure.
Most important, the gap between the developing law and practice on the ground needs to
be narrowed by addressing the root causes of child soldiering.  This can be achieved by: (a)
understanding the context in which children become soldiers and using the practical knowledge
gained concerning child soldiering to identify practical solutions; (b) building bridges and
networking with relevant authorities who have a better understanding of what drives a particular
conflict or armed group; and (c) sticking around long enough to see if preventative or responsive
interventions work.  In so doing, the international community will get a better understanding of
the root causes of child soldiering, develop a strong network at both national and international
levels that can play a big role in influencing compliance from armed groups, and gain a better
understanding of which preventative and responsive programs work, which will help guide
implementation of future programs and assistance for war-affected children.   Only when the
57
socio-political environment of the child soldier is taken into account will the international
community be able to formulate policies that can truly address the problem
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